

Implementing the Uninhabitable House Rehabilitation in Barito Kuala Regency, Indonesia

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Authors' contributions

This work was carried out in collaboration among all authors. All authors read and approved of the final manuscript.

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ABSTRACT

This study examines a bounded implementation case of Indonesia's Social Rehabilitation of Uninhabitable Houses and Environmental Infrastructure programme (Rehabilitasi Sosial Rumah Tidak Layak Huni dan Sarana Prasarana Lingkungan; hereafter the RTLH rehabilitation programme) in Barito Kuala Regency, South Kalimantan. The case comprises a 15-household allocation list contained in provincial programme records and eight purposively selected informants interviewed in April 2026; it is not the complete regency caseload. A descriptive qualitative design combined interviews, direct observation in Antasan Segera Village, and documentary analysis. Evidence was organised manually by programme stage, coded through Edwards III's four implementation dimensions, and triangulated through a source-by-theme matrix. The bounded case showed stronger downstream compliance than upstream access capacity. All 15 listed households passed verification, direct transfers were reported through Bank Kalsel, and recorded construction durations were 10–25 days. Convergent accounts indicated active facilitation and documentary monitoring. By contrast, beneficiaries described uneven information, repeated

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document completion, DTKS and tenure mismatches, and long waits; officials reported constrained allocations and uniform grant values. Wetland conditions are treated as a contextual mechanism rather than a regency-wide causal effect: field documentation showed raised timber construction on wet ground, while participants linked local access and weather to material delivery and repair prioritisation. The study concludes that procedural completion among admitted households cannot establish equitable programme-wide access. Rolling pre-verification, integrated eligibility records, transparent application tracking, and grants responsive to verified damage and local logistics are warranted.

Keywords: *policy implementation; housing rehabilitation; uninhabitable houses; administrative burden; governance.*

1. Introduction

Adequate housing is simultaneously a basic need, a social determinant of health, a household asset, and a material expression of citizenship. Housing deprivation therefore cannot be reduced to a defective roof or wall: it also exposes families to health risks, insecurity, interrupted livelihoods, and diminished dignity. This wider understanding is consistent with Sustainable Development Goal 11 and with Indonesia's Housing and Settlement Areas Law, which defines a house as a habitable dwelling, a site of family development, a reflection of the occupants' dignity, and an asset (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2024; Republik Indonesia, 2011).

Indonesia's regulatory framework is the Social Rehabilitation of Uninhabitable Houses and Environmental Infrastructure programme (Rehabilitasi Sosial Rumah Tidak Layak Huni dan Sarana Prasarana Lingkungan), established through Minister of Social Affairs Regulation No. 20 of 2017 and amended by Regulation No. 6 of 2021. In this article, the operational shorthand "RTLH rehabilitation programme" is used consistently. Eligibility combines socio-economic and physical-housing criteria. Prospective beneficiaries must be poor or vulnerable, satisfy social-welfare data requirements, demonstrate legitimate occupation or ownership of the plot, and inhabit a dwelling whose roof, floor, walls, sanitation, ventilation, or safety do not meet minimum standards (Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia, 2017, 2021). These requirements support accountability, but each also creates an administrative interface at which otherwise eligible households may be delayed or excluded.

Barito Kuala Regency provides a revealing implementation setting because wetlands, tidal areas, and flood-prone settlements shape access, building practice, and material logistics. The baseline statistic in the earlier manuscript required correction. The 2024 key-performance-indicator record identifies 82,248 as the total number of houses and 11,339 as the number of uninhabitable houses, producing 13.79% ($11,339/82,248$); it does not identify 82,248 uninhabitable houses of which 11,339 had been treated. Consequently, 70,909 cannot be interpreted as the residual number of uninhabitable houses. The 2023 LPPD had reported the same denominator but 12,139 uninhabitable houses and 346 improved units, confirming that the series must be read by indicator definition and reporting year rather than as a cumulative treatment balance (Pemerintah Kabupaten Barito Kuala, 2024, pp. 184–185, 269; 2025a, IKK 1.d.4).

Policy implementation theory offers a useful lens for examining this tension. Edwards III (1980) argues that implementation performance depends upon communication, resources, implementer disposition, and bureaucratic structure. Communication determines whether objectives and procedures are transmitted clearly and consistently; resources encompass personnel, finance, facilities, and authority; disposition concerns commitment and willingness to execute the policy; and bureaucratic structure concerns standard operating procedures, coordination, and fragmentation. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) similarly emphasise that policy performance is shaped by standards, resources, inter-organisational communication, implementer characteristics, and the wider social and economic environment.

Empirical studies of Indonesian housing-rehabilitation programmes repeatedly identify a gap between procedural intentions and implementation capacity. Research in Tuban reports limited technical and supervisory personnel and incomplete inter-district coordination (Anggraini & Kurniawan, 2021). Studies in Surabaya highlight the importance of accurate targeting, monitoring, and adaptive governance (Setyobudi & Megawati, 2024; Setiawan & Nawangsari, 2023), while evidence from Prabumulih demonstrates the need for cross-actor collaboration (Priadi et al., 2024). Studies in Karawang and Tomohon further show that targeting, local coordination, and administrative capacity are recurrent concerns (Dewi & Purnamasari, 2024; Ering et al., 2021; Priyatna et al., 2022). Recent research in flood-prone Pontianak also shows that flooding, settlement categorisation, and social exclusion can become institutionally intertwined (MacAfee et al., 2025). The literature nevertheless gives limited attention to how wetland context intersects with data requirements, tenure documentation, grant adequacy, and village-level intermediation in a bounded housing-assistance case.

This article therefore asks two bounded questions: how did the documented RTLH rehabilitation case operate across proposal, verification, disbursement, construction, monitoring, and reporting; and which access and capacity barriers were visible in that case? Its analytical contribution is the distinction between downstream procedural compliance and upstream access capacity. The article does not estimate prevalence across all beneficiaries or villages in Barito Kuala. Instead, it examines how information deficits, data mismatch, tenure documentation, budget constraints, and place-specific logistics were reported to shape entry, waiting time, and repair prioritisation.

2. Method

2.1 Research Design and Study Setting

The study used a descriptive qualitative case-study design to examine implementation within its institutional and geographic context. The regulatory programme was the Social Rehabilitation of Uninhabitable Houses and Environmental Infrastructure programme under the Ministry of Social Affairs regulations, administered in this case through provincial and regency social-service actors. The empirical boundary comprised a 15-household allocation list covering nine villages in six districts, eight role-selected informants, and direct observation in Antasan Segera Village. The copy of the allocation list available in the thesis field materials is undated and does not contain a complete budget-line identifier. It is therefore treated as a bounded documentary cohort, not as the complete annual regency programme or as a cohort assigned to an unverified fiscal year. This case-bounded strategy is appropriate for tracing implementation mechanisms but not for estimating programme-wide frequency or effect (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

2.2 Informants and Sampling

Eight informants were selected purposively because they had direct knowledge of programme standards, verification, delivery, monitoring, local intermediation, or lived experience. Recruitment sought information power across the delivery chain rather than statistical representation or a numerical claim of saturation. Inclusion required direct participation in, oversight of, or experience with the documented case. To minimise disclosure, evidence is reported through role codes rather than personal names. The informant structure is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Informants and their evidentiary roles

Code	Informant category	n	Primary evidentiary role
P1	Provincial social-service official	1	Programme standards, allocation, verification, and oversight
P2	Regency programme manager	1	Local coordination, disbursement, monitoring, and reporting
P3	TKSK/social facilitator	1	Field verification, beneficiary assistance, purchasing, and progress monitoring

Code	Informant category	n	Primary evidentiary role
P4	Neighbourhood leader	1	Initial identification, local information, and proposal support
P5	Beneficiary-group leader	1	Collective coordination, construction, and documentary accountability
P6-P7	Beneficiary households	2	Application experience, waiting time, grant use, and physical works
P8	Non-beneficiary resident	1	Community visibility, perceived reach, and fairness

Source: Research design based on the thesis fieldwork.

2.3 Data Collection

Data were collected through semi-structured interviews, direct observation, and document review between 10 and 15 April 2026. The interview guide covered programme information, eligibility, proposal and verification, fund transfer, purchasing, construction, monitoring, documentary accountability, waiting time, and wetland-related logistics. Observation in Antasan Segera Village focused on housing condition, raised construction, access, and the construction sequence. Documentary evidence included DTKS records, proposed and approved beneficiary lists, proposals, field-verification records, budget plans, transaction evidence, staged construction photographs, and accountability reports. The retained field file identifies interview dates, roles, and topics but does not consistently preserve interview duration, recording status, or verbatim transcript metadata. The analysis therefore cites dated, role-attributed interview accounts and does not introduce unsupported verbatim quotations.

2.4 Analytical Framework and Data Analysis

Analysis followed the interactive logic of data condensation, display, and conclusion drawing (Miles et al., 2014). A manual source-by-theme matrix first organised evidence by programme stage: proposal and verification; disbursement; physical rehabilitation; and monitoring, evaluation, and reporting. A deductive pass then applied Edwards III's four implementation dimensions—communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure—as sensitising categories, not independent variables. An inductive pass identified learning costs, compliance costs, budget rationing, data fragmentation, tenure-document barriers, and local logistics. Claims were tagged to informant codes, observation notes, or named document types. Negative-case checking contrasted official accounts of clear procedures with beneficiary accounts of repeated visits, waiting, and repair trade-offs. The procedural-equity paradox was treated as an analytic proposition emerging from this contrast: orderly completion after admission may coexist with unequal or delayed entry.

2.5 Credibility and Scope

Credibility was strengthened through source triangulation (officials, a facilitator, local actors, beneficiaries, and a non-beneficiary), method triangulation (interviews, observation, and documents), and temporal checking across the implementation sequence. Convergence was recorded only when at least two source types supported a claim; single-source statements are explicitly attributed. The study is interpretive and does not estimate causal effects on health, income, housing durability, fairness, or barrier prevalence. Counts describe the documented cohort and must not be read as a census of housing assistance in Barito Kuala.

2.6 Ethics and Evidence Protection

The article applies data-minimisation safeguards: personal names and exact household addresses are omitted, interview evidence is role-coded, and no bank, identity, land-certificate, or transaction number is reproduced. Figure 2 uses thesis field photographs in which faces and documentary identifiers are not legible at publication scale. The source file supplied for this revision contains no institutional ethics-approval number; accordingly, the manuscript does not claim an approval or exemption that cannot be verified. The

authors remain responsible for retaining the underlying informed-consent and photograph-permission records required by the journal.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1 Programme Reach and Delivery Architecture

The bounded documentary cohort comprised 15 proposed households. The supplied allocation list records all 15 as passing administrative and field verification and being designated as beneficiaries. They were distributed across nine villages in six districts. Beringin Anyar accounted for five beneficiaries and Roham Raya for three; the remaining seven villages each accounted for one. This is a 100% approval rate within the post-proposal list, not a programme-wide success rate. The list contains only households that reached the verification stage, whereas beneficiary and local-actor accounts describe incomplete documents, DTKS absence, and waiting before entry (P4, P6–P8, interviews, 10–15 April 2026).


Table 2. Distribution of the documented beneficiary cohort

No.	Village	District	Beneficiaries	Share
1	Roham Raya	Wanaraya	3	20.0%
2	Alalak Berangas	Alalak	1	6.7%
3	Tamban Sari Baru	Tamban	1	6.7%
4	Semangat Dalam	Alalak	1	6.7%
5	Beringin Anyar	Bakumpai	5	33.3%
6	Antasan Segera	Mandastana	1	6.7%
7	Beringin	Alalak	1	6.7%
8	Sungai Punggu	Anjir Muara	1	6.7%
9	Patih Muhur	Anjir Muara	1	6.7%
	Total	6 districts	15	100.0%

Source: Dinas Sosial Provinsi Kalimantan Selatan, 15-household beneficiary allocation list reproduced in the thesis field materials (undated copy, accessed April 2026). The table represents the documentary cohort only.

The delivery chain moved from local nomination through administrative and physical verification, beneficiary determination, direct transfer to a Bank Kalsel account, construction, and documentary accountability (P1–P3; beneficiary list; verification and accountability records). The two beneficiary households reported receiving Rp25 million per house (P6–P7). A provincial official described a later Rp30 million standard (P1), but the supplied records do not identify the fiscal year, scheme, or budget code needed to verify that comparison. The article therefore reports the two amounts as separate participant accounts and does not treat them as one audited funding schedule. The facilitator account and staged photographs place construction at approximately 10–25 days (P3; construction documentation), broadly consistent with the reported 20-working-day target. These durations describe the documented cases, not all RTLH works in the regency.

Figure 1. Observed RTLH delivery pathway and stage-specific bottlenecks



Source: Author's synthesis of interview, observation, and programme-document evidence.

3.2 Communication: Functional Intermediation but Unequal Information Reach

Communication operated through a layered chain linking the provincial and regency social services, TSKS and social facilitators, village officials, neighbourhood leaders, and beneficiary-group leaders. For households already identified, this chain explained programme objectives, eligibility rules, budget-plan preparation, bank-account procedures, permissible expenditure, and reporting duties. Facilitators and neighbourhood leaders often converted formal requirements into practical assistance, demonstrating the importance of street-level intermediation (Lipsky, 2010).

The same reliance on interpersonal channels, however, limited reach. Officials and local actors described socialisation through village meetings and other social-assistance activities rather than a dedicated campaign (P1–P4). The two beneficiaries said they learned of the programme only after approaching local actors when their houses had become severely dilapidated (P6–P7). Their accounts identified uncertainty about forms, photographs, tenure evidence, DTKS status, and budget plans; one of the two described three document-completion visits (P6–P7, interviews, 10–15 April 2026). These accounts substantiate learning and compliance costs (Herd & Moynihan, 2018), while the official account that requirements were formally communicated provides a contrasting perspective. Communication was therefore functional for households already connected to local intermediaries but incompletely evidenced at programme entry.

3.3 Resources: A Capable Delivery Network under Fiscal and Logistical Constraint

Human and organisational resources were visible throughout the implementation chain. Provincial and regency officials managed policy and verification; TSKS and facilitators accompanied households; village and neighbourhood actors identified candidates; and beneficiary groups organised local labour and records. Direct bank transfer protected the nominal grant from intermediary deductions, while invoices, receipts, account records, and photographic documentation supported financial control. These resources explain why construction and reporting proceeded relatively smoothly after disbursement.

Resource adequacy nevertheless constrained the bounded case. A regency programme manager reported that an indicative 2024 target of about 100 houses was followed by 64 realised units (P2). Because the corresponding budget report was not included in the supplied documentary set, this figure is retained as an attributed official account rather than an audited regency total. The grant was reported as uniform even though damage, foundation requirements, transport, and household co-financing capacity differed (P1–P3, P6–P7). Three place-specific mechanisms were visible. First, the field photographs show raised timber floors and structural work on wet ground, which concentrated spending on foundations and framing. Second, the facilitator linked weather and local access to material delivery and work sequencing (P3). Third, beneficiaries prioritised roofs, floors, walls, kitchens, or sanitation rather than completing every desired repair (P6–P7). These examples make the wetland context concrete but do not estimate its average causal effect across Barito Kuala.

3.4 Disposition: The Strongest Implementation Dimension

Disposition was the clearest implementation strength within the documented case. Officials, the facilitator, local actors, and beneficiaries described active assistance, field visits, material inspection, receipt checking, and monitoring until completion (P1–P7; accountability records). The facilitator did not control household funds but guided bank procedures, purchasing, construction, and reporting (P3). Beneficiaries used local workers and retained transaction evidence (P5–P7). This convergence across interviews, receipts, and staged photographs supports a strong disposition assessment for the case, while not establishing programme-wide effectiveness.

This finding also clarifies the limits of commitment. Strong disposition can compensate for minor administrative and construction difficulties, but it cannot create additional budget, resolve missing land documents instantly, or update national social-welfare data unilaterally. Treating implementer commitment as evidence that the programme is fully effective would therefore mistake effort for capacity.

3.5 Bureaucratic Structure: Clear Procedures, Fragmented Eligibility Infrastructure

The bureaucratic structure was comparatively clear after beneficiary determination. Responsibilities were differentiated: local actors proposed candidates; social-service agencies verified and determined eligibility; facilitators supported implementation; and households controlled spending subject to documentary accountability. Monitoring covered disbursement, use of funds, physical progress, and administrative completeness. Final accountability required receipts, account evidence, a completion statement, and photographs at 0%, 50%, and 100% progress.

The principal weakness lay at the interface among organisations and records. Officials described a clear post-selection division of responsibility (P1–P3), whereas local and household accounts described misalignment among DTKS status, identity documents, village records, and proof of tenure (P4, P6–P8). Poor households on inherited land could have a locally recognised claim without a separated title. Residents absent from or outdated in DTKS first had to pursue data revision. The contrast between clear downstream procedure and fragmented eligibility infrastructure is therefore supported by different actor positions, not inferred from a single synthesis.

Table 3. Synthesis of implementation performance using Edwards III's framework

Dimension	Observed strengths	Observed limitations	Assessment
Communication	Multi-level coordination; facilitators and local leaders translated requirements into practical guidance.	No universal, dedicated outreach; incomplete understanding of DTKS, tenure, photographs, and budget-plan requirements.	Partially implemented
Resources	Active staff network; direct bank transfer; forms, receipts, photographs, and local labour supported delivery.	Limited allocation, disbursement delay, uniform grants, rising prices, and wetland logistics constrained coverage and repair scope.	Partially implemented
Disposition	High commitment, field monitoring, transparent purchasing, beneficiary cooperation, and completion orientation.	Commitment could not offset structural budget and data constraints.	Strongly implemented
Bureaucratic structure	Clear sequence, role division, SOPs, monitoring, and documentary accountability.	Fragmented DTKS, civil, village, and tenure records delayed access and validation.	Procedurally strong; access interface weak

Source: Author's source-by-theme synthesis. Evidence anchors: communication (P1–P4, P6–P8); resources (P1–P3, P6–P7, transaction and construction records); disposition (P1–P7, receipts and staged photographs); bureaucratic structure (P1–P4, P6–P8, verification and accountability records). Assessment criteria: “strong” requires convergent evidence of routine functioning with no major contradiction in the documented cohort; “partial” indicates functioning alongside recurrent access or capacity constraints; “procedurally strong/access weak” indicates consistent downstream controls but cross-source evidence of upstream fragmentation.

3.6 Cross-Cutting Barriers and Their Mechanisms

Three barriers explain why the documented case combined committed actors with constrained access. First, uneven information generated learning costs and repeated document work (P4, P6–P8). Second, limited and uniform finance produced rationing across households and within each repair (P1–P3, P6–P7). Third, DTKS and tenure mismatch generated compliance costs and delayed verification (P2–P4, P6–P8). One beneficiary account placed application in 2022 and approval in 2025 (P6–P7, interview,

April 2026). This report illustrates a possible multi-year administrative delay; it is not presented as the typical waiting time for the regency.

Table 4. Barrier-mechanism-consequence matrix and targeted policy responses

Barrier	Mechanism	Observed consequence	Targeted response
Uneven information dissemination	Programme knowledge travels mainly through meetings, officials, facilitators.	Low awareness, repeated visits, incomplete files, and uncertainty about application status.	Village-level information, one-stop standard public checklists, schedules, and trackable application status.
Limited and inflexible financing	Annual allocation is smaller than demand; uniform grants ignore damage and wetland logistics.	Deferred beneficiaries, partial repairs, household co-financing, and exposure to price escalation.	Tier grants by damage and location; index values to material/transport costs; publish multi-year quotas.
Data and tenure mismatch	DTKS, identity, village, and land records are not synchronised; inherited land may lack a separated title.	Long verification, delayed decrees, and exclusion risk for otherwise eligible households.	Rolling pre-verification, integrated data review, alternative tenure evidence, and legal-document assistance.

Source: Author's source-by-theme matrix based on P1–P8 interviews, verification and accountability records, transaction evidence, field observation, and staged construction photographs. Each consequence is case-bounded.

3.7 Physical Outputs and the Procedural-Equity Paradox

Field documentation confirms visible physical improvement in the photographed cases. Figure 2 shows deteriorated timber structures, construction stages, raised framing on wet ground, and improved post-rehabilitation structures. The two beneficiaries described their repaired houses as safer and more comfortable (P6–P7), while the non-beneficiary provided a community-observer perspective on programme visibility rather than a measure of general public opinion (P8). Prior evidence from Bangka likewise indicates that RTLH assistance can improve family welfare when physical conditions are upgraded (Tursilarini & Udiati, 2020).

Figure 2. Documentary evidence of housing conditions before, during, and after rehabilitation



Source: Thesis field documentation. Images are presented without legible faces, addresses, account details, or documentary identifiers and are used only as contextual evidence for the photographed cases.

The photographs should not be read as proof of programme-wide effectiveness. They show what occurred after the photographed households crossed the access threshold. The analytic proposition is a procedural-equity paradox: construction and reporting can be compliant while entry remains uneven or slow. Cejudo and Michel (2017) distinguish coordination from deeper policy integration, and Vince (2024) similarly emphasises that integrative capacity depends on aligned institutions, instruments, and implementation resources. In the bounded Barito Kuala case, actors coordinated during construction, but social-welfare data, tenure documentation, annual allocation, and place-sensitive technical needs remained incompletely aligned. MacAfee et al. (2025) provide relevant regional context by showing that flood and settlement governance can reinforce social exclusion in another low-lying Kalimantan setting; that study is used as context, not as evidence for the Barito Kuala cases.

The findings also extend Edwards III's framework. Communication, resources, and bureaucratic structure did not operate as independent variables. Limited communication increased documentary errors; fragmented records consumed staff time; long verification exposed households to price changes; and uniform funding forced facilitators and beneficiaries to renegotiate repair priorities. Disposition acted as a bridging capacity, but not as a substitute for integration. The principal implementation deficit was therefore systemic rather than motivational.

4. Conclusion

4.1 Conclusion

The documented RTLH rehabilitation case displayed stronger downstream procedural performance than upstream access capacity. Within the 15-household documentary cohort, verification was completed, direct transfers were reported, physical works were documented within 10–25 days, and monitoring and accountability were active. Convergent evidence supports implementer disposition as the strongest dimension in this case. Communication, resources, and the eligibility interface were more constrained. These findings do not establish an effectiveness rate for the regency-wide programme.

The decisive finding is that procedural completion among admitted households does not establish equitable implementation. Case entry was shaped by uneven information, allocation limits, DTKS status, tenure evidence, and changing construction costs. Wetland conditions were visible in raised construction and were reported to affect access, delivery sequencing, and repair prioritisation, but the design does not estimate their independent effect. The central challenge identified by the case is therefore the incomplete integration of information, eligibility records, financing, and place-sensitive delivery rather than a lack of implementer commitment.

4.2 Policy Recommendations

First, establish a one-stop village information and pre-verification service. Each village should publish a plain-language eligibility checklist, required photographs, acceptable tenure evidence, application windows, and a status-tracking mechanism. This would reduce learning costs and repeated visits.

Second, integrate rolling social-welfare and tenure verification before the annual grant cycle. Regency social services, village government, civil registration, and land-administration actors should jointly identify DTKS discrepancies and provide assistance for inherited or informally documented land.

Third, replace the single grant ceiling with tiered assistance based on verified damage, minimum habitability needs, and a wetland-logistics coefficient. Grant values should be reviewed against material and transport prices, while multi-year quotas should be published to make waiting periods transparent.

Fourth, preserve direct household transfer but connect it to a shared implementation dashboard recording verification dates, reasons for pending status, disbursement, 0/50/100% physical progress, and report completion.

Fifth, extend evaluation beyond expenditure and construction completion. Post-occupancy checks should assess structural durability, sanitation, flood resilience, perceived safety, and whether households incur new debt to complete minimum repairs.

4.3 Limitations and Future Research

The study is limited to one regency, eight informants, two beneficiary households, one directly observed village, and a 15-household documentary cohort whose supplied allocation list lacks a fiscal-year label and complete budget code. The retained field file also lacks consistent interview-duration, recording, transcription, and institutional ethics-approval metadata. The study therefore cannot quantify selection error, barrier prevalence, programme-wide fairness, structural quality, health improvement, housing durability, or long-term welfare. Future research should combine a larger beneficiary/non-beneficiary sample with independent engineering assessment, verified allocation and expenditure records, comparative wetland and non-wetland costs, and longitudinal post-occupancy evaluation. Such work would test whether the mechanisms identified here recur beyond this bounded case.

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